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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CAROL JOAN STONE,
Responaent
-vs-

No.
10698

VAL FRANKLIN STONE,
Appellant and Petitioner

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The Appellant by his attorney hereby petitions the above entitlea Court
for a rehearing upon the sole issue of
whether the trial court errea in deciding there was not "gooa cause" shown
to require the Respondent to submit to
a psychiatric examination pursuant to
Rule 35 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure.
This motion is made pursuant to
Rule 76 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and for the following reasons:
1.

The holding of the majority

opinion that insanity and other mental
conditions can be established without
expert testimony is contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority, and deprives
the trial judges in the State of Utah of
the testimony of psychiatrists in Rule
35 (a) hearings.
2.

The majority opinion is de-

ficient because it nowhere defines
"good cause" notwithstanding the entire
Rule 35 (a) issue depends upon good
cause being shown.
3.

The maj.ori ty opinion has in-

creased the burden of proof required
for "good cause" over that of any other
state in this country, and has in effect
-2-

judicially invalidated the Rule insofar
as the State of Utah is concerned.
4.

The majority opinion sacrifices

the welfare of the minor children to the
welfare of the mother, and decides this
case upon an affidavit which was not presented to nor considered by any of the
three District Court Judges who heard
this matter.

I

THE HOLDING OF THE .MAJORITY OPINION
THAT INSANITY AND OTHER MENTAL CONDITIONS
CAN BE ESTABLISHED WITHOUT EXPERT TESTIMONY rs CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING
WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY, AND DEPRIVES THE
TRIAL JUDGES IN THE STATE OF UTAH OF THE
TESTIMONY OF PSYCHIATRISTS IN RULE 35 (a)
HEARINGS.
.

The majority opinion holds that the
testimony of the mother's psychiatrist
was properly excluded on the basis of the
doctor-patient privilege and that the
-3-

issue of insanity and other mental conditions contemplated by Rule 35 could be
determined without expert testimony.

Such

a holding is contrary to the overwhelming
weight of authority.

See Bowler v. Bowler,

355 Mich. 686, 96 N. W. 2d 129 (1959)
and 74 A.L.R. 2d 1073 entitled Mental
Health of Contesting Parent as a Factor
in Awarding Child Custody.

All of the

cases collected in this annotation involve expert testimony by psychiatrists
and the Courts' holdings are based thereon.

A substantial number of these cases

conclude that observations by lay witnesses such as neighbors, etc. are insufficient.

However, the majority

opinion of this Court has effectively
deprived the trial judges in the State
of Utah of the testimony of expert
psychiatrists if these cases arise in
the future and has in affect held that
-4-

the issue of insanity can be determined
by the testimony of lay witnesses even
though such testimony might be diametrically opposed to the testimony of the
psychiatrist--one whose training and
experience better qualify him to diagnose and evaluate such problems.
Randa v.

~.

312 P. 2d 640 (1957-

Washington) is a case very similar in
nature to the instant case.

In Randa

a litigant claimed the doctor-patient
privilege when asked about prior history
with her doctor.

The lower court sus-

tained the objection, but the Supreme
Court reversed on this ruling and stated:
"In the present case, it is
obvious that the use of the
physician-patient privilege
deprived the court of all
opportunity to ascertain the
material facts necessary to
its determination of the principal issue raised by the
pleadings ••• " [Note 8 p. 645]
In Randa the Respondent cited a
prior case upholding the doctor-patient
-5-

privilege, but the Supreme Court overruled this case on the basis of Rule 35
of the Washington Rules of Civil Procedure which are identical to those in Utah.
The Court held:
"Thus this court, by adopting
Rule of Pleading, Practice
and Procedure 35, intended to
correct the injus_tice which was
permitted to exist in the Nolle
case so that now a trial court
can no longer be compelled by a
claim of privilege to decide any
case involving the mental or
physical condition of any party
to the action after hearing only
a part of the evidence material
to that issue. The means is now
available to the court to have
access to all material facts
relating to the mental or physical condition of any party in
any case where such condition is
in controversy. The rule of the
Nolle case has in effect, been
abrogated by the adoption of
Rule of Pleading, Practice and
Procedure 35."
The Appellant submits the Washington citation, together with the
citation set forth hereinafter from
The united States Supreme court and
-6-

the various State Courts, clearly establishes the correct principle of
interpretation which is that Rule 35
(a) makes it possible now for the trial
judge to receive evidence from qualified
psychiatrists whereas under the common
law this was impossible becuase of the
doctor-patient privilege.

However, the

majority opinion in the instant case has
buried this enlighted interpretation and
has in effect resurrected the conunon law
privilege so that it now exists in the
State of Utah and so that now Rule 35 (a)
has no application to mental examinations.

II
THE MAJORITY OPINION IS DEFICIENT
BECAUSE IT NOW1iERE DEFINES "GOOD CAUSE"
NO'l'WITHSTANDING THE ENTIRE RULE 35 (a)
ISSUE DEPENDS UPON GOOD CAUSE BEING
SHOWN.
The majority opinion nowhere defines
"good cause" and in fact that term is not
-7-

even mentioned in the majority opinion;
notwithstanding the entire issue in this
case depends upon whether "good cause"
for a mental examination was shown.
The majority opinion cites Rule 35 (a)
then promptly ignores the good cause
aspect and goes on to something else.
In contrast, the dissenting opinion recognizes that "good cause" is the pivotal
point in this case and elaborates on
exactly what quantum of proof is required.
The majority opinion on the otherhand,
leaves the reader in complete darkness
as to what facts a litigant.must produce to show "good cause."
The Appellant further submits that
by failing to define "good cause" and by
failing to cite any evidence upon which
the majority opinion bases its conclusion, this Court has left Appellant without any idea of what would be important
-8-

or material in the future if the mother
had recurring symptoms of mental illness.
The majority opinion has corranended the
trial judge for saying, that, "If it
appears that at some future time that a
psychiatric and physical examination is
necessary, application to the court shall
be made imrr.ediately;" however, it has not
suggested what facts might be sufficient
for such an application.

The majority

opinion as it now stands could well
mean that the father would need additional symptoms to those set forth in
the dissenting opinion of Justice Ellett
before any further application could be
justified.

This would mean that if the

mother suffered these same symptoms tomorrow and if the father tried to make
application to the Court for a Rule 35
commitment as Judge Hanson suggests,
that counsel for the mother could cite
-9-

the majority opinion as saying that there
was not sufficient evidence shown for such
a commitment.

It would then be incumbent

upon the father to produce additional
evidence; even though any psychiatrist
would concede that such symptoms warrant
not only a Rule 35 conunitment but also
hospitalization.

The Appellant submits

that such a ruling goes far beyond any
"good cause" requirements contemplated
by Rule 35, and in effect makes it im-

possible to ever use Judge Hanson's
suggestion.
III
THE MAJORITY OPINION HAS INCREASED
BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED FOR "GOOD
CAUSE" OVER THAT OF ANY OTHER STATE IN
THIS COUNTRY, AND HAS IN EFFECT JUDICIALLY
INVALIDATED THE RULE INSOFAR AS THE STATE
OF UTAH IS CONCERNED.
'11 HE

The dissenting opinion of Justice
Ellett as it appears on Page 6 of the
-10-

green sheets, contains the general rules
relating to the quantum of proof required
for a "good cause" commitment.

The

United States Supreme Court has held
that it takes very little showing to
convince the court that there is "good
cause" for having an examination in a
proper case, and the Appellant submits
it is error for this Court to go so much
further than the United States Supreme
Court has gone.

Schlagenhauf v. Holder,

379 v. s. 104, 13 L. Ed. 2d 152, 85 S.

CT. 234 (1965).
The majority opinion states in part
as follows:
"While there is some evidence
that the Plaintiff has at times
been somewhat erratic in her behavior, there is countervailing
evidence that the mental and/or
nervous difficulties she suffered
from had been temporary, and that
she was a good mother to her
children. The capstone on this
point is that upon disputed evidence, the trial court made an
affirmative finding that she was
-11-

not mentally incompetent nor
otherwise unfit to care for
them."
[Emphasis added]
The Appellant will readily concede
that Rule 35 matters are discretionary
with the trial judge when there is a
conflict in the testimony.

However,

Appellant submits the salient facts in
this case are not in dispute.

The

following facts testified to by the witnesses at the hearing before Judge Hanson
were undisputed:

A.

The Plaintiff could not identify
her own children on at least
two occasions. On one of these
occasions, a neighbor took the
mother to primary and when the
neighbor brought the children
out to the car, the mother
told her to take them back,
that they were not.her children.
On another occasion, the
mother told the father that the
principal had sent the wrong
children home from school and
she wanted him to do something
about them.

B.

The Plaintiff believed she had
a tape recorder in her head.

c.

The Plaintiff believed her
neighbors were spying on her.
-12-

-D.

The Plaintiff had her phone
changed because she felt other
people were spying on her.

E.

These symptoms were not temporary but had persisted over
a period from June, 1965, to
April, 1966, and were a recurrence of symptoms that had
arisen in 1958-1960 and had
required the mother to be
hospitalized and treated with
electric shock. Furthermore,
the mother's psychiatrist had
been treating her continuously
since 1958 to the time of the
trial and he so testified.

F.

The Plaintiff's psychiatrist
had reconunended that she be
committed to a mental hospital for psychiatric evaluation.

G.

The Plaintiff refused to let
her psychiatrist testify in
Court as to whether or not
she was insane.

The Appellant submits these facts are
not disputed by anyone testifying at the
trial and submits that any inference that
they were disputed cannot be justified by
reference to any page in the record on
appeal in this case.

It is true that

there was some dispute on other issues

-13-

such as whether the mother washed the
children properly and fed and clothed them,
but the Appellant submits that as to the
salient mental facts there was no dispute.
Moreover, even if the evidence was conflicting the burden of showing "good
cause" was certainly sustained by the
facts presented at the hearing before
Judge Hanson, and the evidence produced
at that hearing is the only evidence that
would be important to this Court.

It was

this evidence which the trial judge used
to render his decision and not the allegations in an affidavit or in -the answers to
any interrogatories as suggested in the
majority opinion by this Court.
By holding that the facts set forth
above, and in Justice Ellett's opinion,
do not establish "good cause", the majority
opinion has in effect equated good cause
with preponderance of the evidence, or
-14-

possibly with an even higher degree of
proof.

It has also substantially raised

the degree of proof which has heretofore
been required in Utah for "good cause"
production of documents under Rule 34,
and for "good cause" physical examinations
in personal injury cases.

This is con-

trary to all of the authorities.

In

addition to Schlagenhauf, supra., see
also the following:

Beach v. Beach, 114

F. 2d 479 (1940); Greyhound Corp. v.
Superior Court, Merced county, 15 cal.
Rptr. 90, 364 P. 2d 266 (1961).

Note

22 p. 283 wherein "good caus.e" is discussed at length; 4 Moore's Federal Practice 2449 Section 34.08 "Showing of Good
cause," and page 2559 where the author
states, "it will usually be easy enough
to make such a showing where the physical
or mental condition of the party is actually
in controversy"; Richardson v. Richardson,
-15-

236 P. 2d 121 (1951).

Note 10 p. 126.

IV
THE MAJORITY OPINION SACRIFICES THE!'
WELFARE OF TrIE MINOR CHILDREN TO THE WELFARE OF THE MOTHER, AND DECIDES THIS CASE
UPON AN AFFIDAVIT WHICH WAS NOT PRESENTED
·ro NOR CONSIDERED BY ANY OF THE THREE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES WHO HEARD THIS
.r.'JATTER.
The majority opinion states in part
as follows:
"The question of a person's
sanity nearly always involves
considerable delicacy. If mere
allegations in an affidavit compelled the court to require a
party to submit to a psychiatric
examination, a way would be open
for opposing parties to harass,
annoy or intimidate each other.
The potential for mischief in such
a situation is obvious and the
court would always be well advised
in exercising caution and restraint
in regard to such a request, as it
appears was done here."
[Emphasis
added].
This obvious concern for the welfare
of the mother is commendable but it fails
to recognize that the welfare of the
minor children is paramount in a case
-16-

of this nature and that any embarrassment to the mother must yield, especially
when the minor children's future emotional
and mental condition is at issue as it
was in the instant case.

Moreover the

fact that the mother had been seeing a
psychiatrist continually since 1958 to
the time of the trial argues against any
embarrassment or danger resulting from
a Rule 35 (a) examination.

The majority

opinion's concern about opening a pandora's box which would allow mental
commitments based only on an affidavit is
not justified by either the Rule itself
or the facts in this case.
The Rule itself has a built-in
protection against such an evil.
specifically requires (1)
motion, (2)
and (3)

It

A written

Notice to adverse party,

A hearing on the allegation in

the motion.

The record clearly shows
-17-'

a written motion was filed; notice was
served upon the Respondent--mother [the
Sheriff's return says the Defendant, but
this is an obvious error since the
Defendant would not have served himself),
and a hearing was held.

The trial judge

did not look simply to an affidavit as
the majority opinion seems to imply in
the citation above.

The affidavit has

absolutely no bearing on this case and
Appellant does not know why it was cited
by the majority opinion.

The Appellant

has never suggested at any time that mere
allegations in an affidavit ·were sufficient; and the trial judge did not base
his decision on any affidavit.

The

original appeal to this Court claimed
error on the part of the trial judge in
deciding that the evidence produced ~
the trial

was insufficient to warrant

a Rule 35 conunitment and not that the
-18-

trial judge decided that some affidavit
failed to support such a commitment.

The

Appellant readily agrees that the practice
of law by affidavit as opposed to a~
adversary proceeding in open court is
at best a poor way to establish just;.;i.ce
and truth.
The majority opinion has misinterpreted either the procedure which was used
in the lower court or the evidence upon
which the court rendered its decision.
In either case, the Appellant submits
that a rehearing is justified to clarify
these matters since the affidavit aspect
emphasized by this Court was not a part
of the trial judge's consideration at all.
The majority opinion further intimates
that there was something wrong in consolidating the Rule 35 issue with the other
matters raised in the petition7 and suggests that the Rule 35 matter should have
been treated separately and prior to
-19-

hearing the other matters.

Appellant

attempted to do this both at the April
8 hearing before Judge Jeppson and at
the pre-trial hearing before Judge Elton:
however, counsel for the mother stated
that he could not be ready to hear even
the Rule 35 matter for several months because of his congested office schedule.
Based upon this representation the law
and motion judge and the pre-trial judge
were willing to consolidate all issues
rather than prolong the matter first for
a Rule 35 hearing and then later for a
second hearing on the other points raised
in the original petition.

Apparently,

the trial judge (Hanson] concurred in
this procedure because he received testimony on all issues and then rendered his
opinion on them all including the Rule 35
matters.

In other words, he received

evidence on the Rule 35 issue and treated .
-20-

it as a separate matter and made a
separate order as to it.

Nowhere did

any of the trial judges intimate that it
was improper to consolidate the Rule 35
matters with the other issues.

Moreover,

counsel for the mother did not object to
any part .of this procedure.

He has raised

a procedural irregularity for the first
time in his brief on appeal to this
Court and has apparently convinced a
majority of this Court that the trial
judges were guilty of some procedural
error which counsel for the mother sought,
agreed to, and actively participated in.
All the father tried to do was to
get the matter heard as soori as possible
because he felt there was an aggravated
situation in the home which required
immediate attention.

He was willing to

consolidate the Rule 35 matters with the
other issues set forth in his original
-21-

petition because that appeared to be the
quickest way to handle the matter due to
the mother's counsel's representation that
his office schedule was too congested to
hear any of the issues earlier than June 13,
which was about two and one-half months
after the original petition was filed.
This procedure apparently had the blessing
of three District Court Judges and it makes
sense.

By having only one hearing, the

trial judge could receive evidence on all
issues and then take the matter under
advisement until he received a report
from an independent Court-appointed
psychiatrist.

After evaluation was

received, a complete judgment could then
be entered.

The Appellant submits that

such a consolidation has the further
advantage of avoiding a multiplicity of
trials with the attendant extra attorney's
fees, court costs, and time involved.
-22-

However, the majority opinion has
intimated that something was wrong with
this procedure and Appellant submits
that a rehearing is justified and would
be of great benefit to attorneys in this
State to know what procedure is going to
be.allowed by this court in matters of
this nature in the future.
For the reasons set forth above,
the Appellant respectfully requests a
rehearing as to the Rule 35 issue only
and asks this Court to grant the motion
for an independent psychiatric examination and to continue the matter for
further hearing until the independent
psychiatrist can give testimony to the
trial judge after which the trial judge
should make new findings and such an order
as is warranted by all of the evidence
presented to him.
-23-

The Appellant submits
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minor children justifies such action.
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